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Edwards: McCarran Amendment General Adjudications in Wyoming: Threshold Pr

McCARRAN AMENDMENT GENERAL
ADJUDICATIONS IN WYOMING:
THRESHOLD PROBLEMS
On January 22, 1977 the Wyoming Legislature approved
Section 1-37-106 of the Wyoming Statutes,1 a new section
of the Wyoming Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,2
providing for the general adjudication of water rights in a
river system, to be brought in state district court by the
State of Wyoming upon the relation of its attorney general.3
On January 24, 1977 the State of Wyoming filed suit under
Section 1-37-106 for the general adjudication of all rights
to the use of water in the Big Horn River System.4 The
United States was joined in the proceeding, and on the same
day the suit was filed the state district court ruled that
joinder was proper 5 under the McCarran Amendment.6 When
the United States attempted to remove the suit to federal
district court, its motion was denied.'
Initially, the state district court felt that it would be
appropriate to certify certain legal and factual issues to
the state board of control,8 as provided in the statute;9
Copyright@ 1981 by the University of Wyoming

1. 1977 Wyo. SEss. LAWS Ch. 2., § 1. Now Wyo. STAT. § 1-37-106 (1977).
[Hereinafter cited in text as Section 1-37-106].
2. Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-37-101 to 1-37-115 (1977).
3. Wyo. STAT. § 1-37-106(a) (1977).
4. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming No. 4993 (Wyo.
Dist. Ct., 5th Dist., filed Jan. 24, 1977). (Hereinafter cited in text as Big
Horn River Adjudication].
5. Id. The district court's order provided:
1. This action is a general adjudication of all water rights on the Big Horn
River System and all other sources in Water Division Number Three, State
of Wyoming, and 2. That the United States of America by its enactment
of 43 U.S.C. § 666 has waived its sovereign immunity and has consented
to be joined in this action...
6. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976). The McCarran Amendment is a waiver of sovereign
immunity for a designated class of suits:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit
(1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system
or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it
appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of
acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase,
by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party
to such suit.
7. Wyoming v. United States of America and all persons in the Big Horn
River System and other sources in Water Division Number Three, State of
Wyoming, No. C77-039K (D. Wyo. May 31, 1977).
8. Letter of Judge Joffe to counsel of record, at 2 (December 19, 1977).
9. WYO. STAT. § 1-37-106 (1977). The statute reads, in relevant part:
(a) The state of Wyoming upon the relation of the attorney general may
institute an action to have determined in a general adjudication the
nature, extent, and relative priority of the water rights of all persons
in any river system and all other sources, provided:
(i) For the purpose of this section:
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however this use of the board of control was objected to by
the United States. ° Ultimately, the district court chose a
former Wyoming Congressman as special master, in early
1979.111
By mid-1980, the United States had refused to accept
the validity of the State Engineer's list of adjudicated rights,
and had announced its intention to challenge all private
rights for partial or total abandonment. Notice of this challenge was given to private water right holders by publication
in area newspapers. 2 In June of 1980, the special master
began to hear the United States' challenges of previously
adjudicated private water rights. The resulting confusion
(A)

The term "general adjudication" shall mean the judicial determination or establishment of the extent and priority of the
rights to use water of all persons on any river system and all
other sources within the state of Wyoming. The court conducting such a general adjudication shall:
(I) Certify to the state board of control those legal and
factual issues which the court deems appropriate for
the board to determine. Upon such certification, the
board shall exercise those powers and follow those procedures set forth in Rule 53 of the Wyoming Rules of
Civil Procedure;
(II) Confirm those rights evidenced by previous court. decrees, or by certificates of appropriation, or by certif-.
icates of construction heretofore issued by the Wyoming
state board of control;
(III) Determine the status of all uncancelled permits to acquire the right to the use of the water of the state of
Wyoming and adjudicate all perfected rights thereunder
not theretofore adjudicated under W.S. 41-211 [§ 41-4-

511];
(IV)

Determine the extent and priority date of and adjudicate any interest in or right to use the water of the
river system and all other sources not otherwise Tepresented by the aforedescribed decrees, certificates, or
permits;
(V) Establish, in whatever form determined to be most
appropriate by the court, one or more tabulations or
lists of all water rights and their relative priorities on
the river system and all other sources;
(B) The word "person" shall be construed to mean an individual,
a partnership, a corporation, a municipality, the state of
Wyoming, the United States of America, or any other legal
entity, public or private;
10. Letter of Judge Joffe, supra note 8.
11. Order of Judge Joffe (May 4, 1979).
Counsel for Wyoming, the United States, and the Shoshone and Bannack Tribes (who by this stage had entered the case on behalf of Indian
water claims agreed that the board of control should not serve- as Special
Master, because of conflicts. These conflicts had to do with members of the
board claiming water rights in the area to be adjudicated, and with the
board as Special Master passing on its own prior rulings. Counsel- were able
to agree to former Wyoming Congressman Teno Roncalio as Special-Master,
and the court so ordered. Interview with Judge Joffe (October 6, 1980)
(notes on file with Land & Water Law Review).
..
12. Addendum to schedule of the special master (May 7, 1980). Final notice of
the special master (May 10, 1980).
..
:.J1. . ....
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over the adequacy of notice to private parties, and the sheer
magnitude of the challenges led to a stipulation between
the State of Wyoming and the United States that all previously adjudicated private rights be provisionally confirmed
by the special master, and that all challenges of private
rights be deferred. The United States agreed to wait until
the priorities of its rights on the Big Horn River System
were fixed, and to confine its challenges to private rights
senior to the United States in priority date. 3
The stipulation between the State of Wyoming and the
United States only postponed the questions which were
raised when the special master began to hear challenges
based on abandonment. Those questions were concerned with
the proper roles of the special master and the board of
control in a suit under Section 1-37-106.
This comment will examine Section 1-37-106 in the
context of statutes and case law, both state and federal.
It will also examine the roles to be played by the board of
control and a special master in a general adjudication under
Section 1-37-106. Reference to particular facts in the Big
Horn River Adjudication is intended to point out generally
applicable problems and solutions in any action which may
be brought under the new statute.
BACKGROUND

In all of the western states, water rights may be
adjudicated under special statutory procedures, in addition
to ordinary civil actions.' 4 The concept of a special statutory
procedure began in Colorado, 5 as a purely judicial proceeding. 6 From statehood on, Wyoming has used the purely
administrative approach to adjudications' under special
13. Order of the special master (June 26, 1980).
14. For a thorough history and discussion of special statutory adjudication
procedures, see HUTCHINS, 2 WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES ch. 15 (1974). [Hereinafter cited as HUTCHINS]. See also, Note,
Finality of General Adjudication Proceedings in the Seventeen Western
States, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 152 (1966).
15.

LONG, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION, 193 (1901).

16. HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 453.

17. The early difficulties and ultimate success of administrative adjudications
are chronicled by Wyoming's first state engineer, Elwood Mead, in MEAD,
IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS ch. XI (1903).
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statutes. In Wyoming, such administrative adjudications are
carried out by the board of control, 8 and are final unless
appealed to the courts.' 9
One persistent problem under both the Colorado and
Wyoming models was that no adjudication could be truly
general if a water right of the United States were involved,
and if the United States chose to assert sovereign immunity."0
In 1952, Congress passed the McCarran Amendment, waiving
sovereign immunity in certain loosely-defined suits to adjudicate water rights."'
With the advent of federal non-Indian reserved rights,"
and their inevitable clash with western views, the United
States sought to avoid submitting to state jurisdiction, the
McCarran Amendment notwithstanding. 3 In Dugan v.
Rank, 4 the Supreme Court affirmed a construction of the
McCarran Amendment which restricted its operation to
general adjudications of all water rights on a river system.
Dugan thus made it plain the United States could not be
joined under the McCarran Amendment in any proceeding
in which private parties sought to adjudicate a limited
number of claims solely between themselves and the government. All the rights of all the owners on a given stream
must be involved in the proceeding. 5
A series of three Colorado cases which reached the
Supreme Court measured the Colorado statutory adjudication procedures against the McCarran yardstick. It became
apparent that the Court in Dugan had been more interested
in preventing private suits under the McCarran waiver, than
in laying down a strict definition of general adjudication.
In United States v. District Court in and for the County of
Eagle," the Court approved joinder of the United States in
18. WYO. STAT. § 41-4-301 et seq. (1977).
19. WYo. STAT. § 41-4-326 (1977).
20. CLARK, 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 106 (1967).

21. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976). For pertinent language of the McCarran Amendment, see note 6, supra.

22. See, e.g., Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) and
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
23. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 203 (1971).
24. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). [Hereinafter cited in text as Dugan].
25. Id. at 618.
26. United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S.
520 (1971). [Hereinafter cited in text as Eagle County].
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a supplemental adjudication" in state court. It dismissed as
"extremely technical" the government's argument that the
proceeding was not a general adjudication because the owners
of previously decreed rights were not before the Colorado
court.2"
In United States v. District Court in and for Water
Division No. 5,29 the companion case to Eagle County, the

Court also upheld joinder of the United States under the
Colorado Water Rights Determination and Administration
Act of 1969,"0 involving monthly proceedings before a referee
on water rights applications filed within a particular month. 3
According to the Court, Water Division No. 5, like Eagle
County, "reaches all claims, perhaps month by month but
inclusively in the totality ... "I'
Finally, in Colorado River Water Conservation District
v. United States,"3 the Court expressly allowed state adjudication of Indian reserved rights. It pointed out that its
decisions in Eagle River and Water Division No. 5 had
subjected federal reserved rights to state general adjudication proceedings, and that to avoid piecemeal adjudications,
Indian rights should not have special treatment. ' The Court
stressed the availability of a comprehensive adjudication
system in Colorado, as evidenced by the Colorado Water
Rights Determination and Administration Act, previously
approved in Eagle County and Water Division No. 5, and by
responsibility given to the state engineer to manage and
allocate Colorado water in accordance with adjudicated
rights."
These Colorado successes did not go unnoticed in Wyoming. One of the unresolved questions about the scope of
27. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 148-9-7 (1963).

28. United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, supra
note 26, at 525.
29. United States v. District Court in and for Water Division No. 5,401 U.S.
527 (1971). [Hereinafter cited in text as Water Division No. 5.].
30. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-101 et seq. (1973).
31. CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 37-92-302 (1973).

32. United States v. District Court in and for Water Division No. 5. supra
note 29, at 529.

33. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976).
84. Id. at 810.
85. Id. at 819-20.
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the McCarran Amendment's immunity waiver had been
whether and to what extent it consented to administrative
proceedings. It had been pointed out that it would be
anomalous to waive sovereign immunity for proceedings in
some states but not in others. 6 The emphasis on "suit" and
"court" in the language of the McCarran Amendment were
said to be simple drafting errors by some commentators.37
However, no congressional redrafting was forthcoming, so
the uncertainty remained about administrative hearings,
under the Wyoming system, as "suits."3 Hence Wyoming's
interest in the Colorado procedure, which had now survived
Supreme Court challenges three times.
After Eagle River, Dean Trelease noted the impatience
of the Supreme Court with "technical" and "frivolous"
objections of the United States, and wrote that the Court
might be "quite willing to accept a construction of the
Amendment which includes an administrative adjudication,
subject to appeal to the courts, or to transfer to the courts
for final stages, as falling within the principal of Eagle
County." 9
Section 1-37-106 of the Wyoming Statutes 0 was passed
as a response to the trio of Supreme Court cases from
Colorado, beginning with Eagle River. 1 The attraction of
these three cases was that they provided a pre-approved
procedure for conducting McCarran Amendment general
adjudications in state district courts. The Colorado experience was also of particular interest to Wyoming because it
provided a guide to dealing with adjudications of Indian and
non-Indian reserved rights.
Other concerns had been raised in Wyoming prior to
passage of the new statute. It had been pointed out that
86. Comment, Adjudication of Water Rights Claimed by the United StatesApplication of Common-Law Remedies and the McCarran Amendment of
1952, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 94, 117 (1960).

37. Id. at 118. See also, CLARK, 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 95 (1967).
88. See, Comment, The McCarran Amendment-A Method of Clarifying the
Implied Reservation Doctrine, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 587, 595 (1972).

supra note 22, at 207.
§ 1-37-106 (1977).
41. Hanks, Federal-StateRights and Relations, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 106.2 n. 76 (Clark ed. 1978 Supp.). See also, Comment, Determination of
Federal-State Rights Pursuant to the MeCarran Amendment: General Adjudications in Wyoming, 12 LAND & WATER L. REv. 457 (1977).
39.

TRELEASE,

40. WYO.

STAT.
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there were large deviations between water use in the field
and water records in the state engineer's office.42 All of
Wyoming's streams had been adjudicated between 1892 and
1922."3 This raised two problems. Water records were substantially out of date, and no statutory mechanism contemplated the readjudication of Wyoming streams." Passage
of the new adjudication statute made it possible to deal with
the problems of state records and previously adjudicated
streams.
Section 1-37-106 of the Wyoming Statutes45 should be
construed with several purposes in mind. It was passed to
bring Wyoming's statutory general adjudications within the
McCarran Amendment, so that federal and Indian claims
could be adjudicated in state district court, and so that all
persons within a river system would know their relative
priorities. But the new statute was not passed in a vacuum.
It should also be construed so as to do the least possible
violence to other state statutes and state case law.
An extensive examination of Section 1-37-106 was
made in this law review, during the same year it was passed."
The conclusion was that, while the statute was open to
possible challenge on grounds that it did not provide for a
general adjudication or a judicial proceeding, its close
similarity to the Colorado system should bring it within
the scope of the McCarran Amendment." It remains now
to examine the effect of Section 1-37-106 on state statutes
and case law, in the context of the only action yet brought
under Section 1-37-106: the Big Horn River Adjudication.
STATUS OF PREVIOUSLY ADJUDICATED RIGHTS

The new general adjudication statute, Section 1-37-106,
provides: "The court conducting such a general adjudication
shall: . . . (II) confirm those rights evidenced by previous
42. McIntire, The Disparity Between State Water Rights Records and Actual
Water Use Patterns,5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23 (1970).
43. TRELEASE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAw 182 (3rd ed. 1979).
44. TRELEASE, supra note 23, at 207-208.
45. WYO. STAT. § 1-37-106 (1977).
46. Comment, supra note 41.
47. Id. at 483-4.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 16 [1981], Iss. 1, Art. 3

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVI

court decrees, or by certificates of appropriation, or by
certificates of construction heretofore issued by the Wyoming
State Board of Control."48 This language raises issues which
turn on the interpretation of the word confirm.
If the language of a statute is unambiguous, there is
no need for a court to construe it.49 An ambiguity exists
when a word or group of words in a statute is susceptible
of more than one meaning." Section 1-37-106 provides no
definition of confirm, nor has the term been construed by
the Wyoming Statutes in other sections. The dictionary
definition of confirm suggests several meanings:
Confirm: To complete or establish that which was
imperfect or uncertain; to ratify what has been
done without authority or insufficiently. To make
firm or certain; to give new assurance of truth or
to put aside past doubt; to give approval
certainty;
sl
to.
This definition shows the ambiguity of confirm, and hence
the necessity of judicial construction. Three possible meanings of confirm suggest themselves: confirm means 1)
"rubber stamp," or 2) "de novo inquiry," or 3) "limited
inquiry."
In construing an ambiguous statute, the court must use
the legislative language in light of the purposes intended to
be accomplished by the legislature." And in ascertaining
legislative intent, the court must "look to the mischief the
statute was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of the law and all other prior and contemporaneous
facts and circumstances."5 3 In this regard, the court could
look at any or all of the following in construing confirm:
1) the Colorado McCarran Amendment cases which reached
48. WYO. STAT. § 1-37-106(a)(i)

(1977).

49. Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 558, 564 (Wyo. 1979).
50. State ex rel. Albany County Weed and Pest Dist. v. Board of County
Commissioners of Albany County, 592 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Wyo. 1979).
51. H. BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 270 (5th ed. 1979).
52. Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State Board of Control, 578 P.2d 557,
561 (Wyo. 1978).

53. Id. at 563.
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the United States Supreme Court; 2) discrepancies between
Wyoming water records and actual use; 3) the fact that all
streams in Wyoming have been adjudicated; 4) other Wyoming statutes; and 5) Wyoming case law."
If confirm were taken as equivalent to "rubber stamp,"
then previously adjudicated rights could not be challenged
for abandonment or forfeiture, or any other reason." Given
the Colorado experience discussed previously, this approach
probably stays within the scope of the McCarran Amendment." The difficulty is that there is no opportunity to
update the state engineer's records by bringing them into
line with current water use. However, given the uncertainty
of the law in this rapidly changing area of adjudicating
federal claims in state courts, the Legislature may well have
adopted this definition of confirm, to avoid putting established rights at risk.
If confirm were taken as equivalent to "de novo inquiry,"
then previously adjudicated rights could be challenged for
any reason. This approach would permit questions of abandonment and forfeiture to be raised, but it would also permit
questions to be raised about the validity of the original
adjudication. 8 However, questioning the validity of a prior
adjudication would be quite difficult. In Wyoming, a decree
fixing a water right priority is ordinarily res judicata as to
all parties to the action in regard to all matters directly
and necessarily decided as the basis of judgment. 9 The
legislature cannot make the board of control's adjudication
of water priorities binding upon one not a party to the proceedings, but the board's adjudication is "at least prima
facie evidence of correctness," even as to those not parties
to the proceedings." ° A decree of adjudication
54. See text accompanying notes 41 through 45, supra.
55. See Comment, supra note 41, at 481, for a discussion adopting the "rubber

stamp," approach.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See text accompanying note 26, supra.
See text accompanying note 42, supra.
Such a possibility was foreseen in TRELEASE, supra note 23, at 208.
Van Tassel Real Estate and Livestock Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 49 Wyo.
333, 54 P.2d 906, 915, cert. den., 299 U. S. 574 (1936).

60. Laramie Irrigation and Power Co. v. Grant, 44 Wyo. 392, 13 P.2d 235, 243
(1932).
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is admissible against the world to show that the
grantee therein has title to the water in question
according to the terms thereof, and it is as effectual
as any binding judgment can be, except as to him,
not a party to the same adjudication, who can overcome the prima facie effect thereof. 1
Adjudicated water rights will not be set aside unless
justified by clear and convincing evidence;2 if such rights
are of long standing, the courts will be even more reluctant
to set them aside."3 It is also proper to note that in a 1949
declaratory judgment action, the Wyoming Supreme Court
refused to allow an attack on a decree approving the action
of the board of control in awarding water rights, when the
action of the board and the decree of the district court were
"merely erroneous",61
It seems politically unrealistic to impute to the Legislature the intent to allow the validity of previous adjudications to be attacked: it is simply too high a price to pay for
the privilege of adjudicating in state court. Such a definition
of confirm would also be inconsistent with the current Wyoming statutes, which state that "[t] he final orders or decrees
of the state board of control, in the proceedings provided by
law for the adjudication and determination of rights to the
use of the public waters of the state, shall be conclusive as
to all prior appropriations." 5 This language has remained
unchanged since it was approved in 1901.6"
Of the two approaches to defining confirm, the first is
preferable because it does not place established rights at
risk; it avoids the difficutly inherent in opening old decrees,
and it is probably the intent of the Legislature.
However, a third approach is possible. If confirm were
taken as equivalent to "limited inquiry," then previously
adjudicated rights could be challenged for abandonment or
61. Campbell v. Wyoming Development Co., 55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124, reh.
den., 55 Wyo. 347, 102 P.2d 745, 750-751 (1940).

62. Wheatland Irr. Dist. v. Pioneer Canal Co., 464 P.2d 533, 537 (Wyo. 1970).
63. White v. Wheatland Irr. Dist., 413 P.2d 252, 259 (Wyo. 1966).
64. Laramie Rivers Co. v. Le Vasseur, 65 Wyo. 414, 202 P.2d 680, 683 (1949).
-65. Wyo.- STAT. § 41-4-326 (1977).
66. 1901 WYo. SEss. LAws Ch. 67. § 1.
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7
forfeiture, but old decrees could not be reopened. This
approach would allow the state engineer's office to update
its records6" without calling into question the validity of all
the old decrees themselves. Such a definition of confirm
9
would also be consistent with state statutes and case law.

This third approach combines the advantages of the
"rubber stamp" and "de novo inquiry" approaches, by making
secure the validity of previous adjudications and by permitting the update of the state engineer's records. It also
avoids the disadvantages of an all or nothing approach.
Since the purpose of a declaratory judgment is to
terminate controversy and remove uncertainty, the result of
failure to raise claims or issues which could be raised under
either the "de novo" or "limited inquiry" approaches, ought
to be that such claims and issues are barred in any future
litigation. The res judicata effect of an adjudication under
Section 1-37-106 should therefore be co-extensive with the
jurisdiction of the district court, including claims and issues
which could have been raised but were not.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD OF CONTROL:
ABANDONMENTS AND PRIORITIES

On questions of abandonment in Wyoming, there has
been a jurisdictional tug-of-war between the courts and the
Legislature." The Wyoming Supreme Court has resisted
efforts to construe past statutes as depriving the courts of
jurisdiction over abandonment, although the court did concede early on that a decision on abandonment, made initially
by the board of control, was final unless appealed to the
courts.7 Later the court held that state courts had concurrent jurisdiction over abandonment questions.72 Finally,
in 1971, in Kearney Lake, Land and Reservoir Co. v. Lake
67. WYO. STAT. § 41-4-326 (1977), limits rehearings to one year after any final
order of the board of control adjudicating the priorities upon any stream.
68. See text accompanying note 42, supra.
69. See text accompanying note 60, supra.
70. See Note, Primary Jurisdictionof the Board of Control over Questions of
Water Rights, 7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 599 (1972).
71. Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 P. 764,
767 (1925).

72. Louth v. Kaser, 364 P.2d 96 (Wyo. 1961).
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DeSmet Reservoir Co.,7" the court held that the board of
control had primary jurisdiction over questions of abandonment.
The 1973 legislative response, in the next biennial
session after Kearney Lake, was Section 41-3-401 (b) of the
Wyoming Statutes,7 4 which conferred exclusive original
jurisdiction on the board of control for all abandonment
proceedings. However, Section 1-37-106 contemplated that
in a suit under its provisions, the district court would have
discretion to certify to the board of control "those legal and
factual issues which the court deems appropriate"." This
procedure is in obvious conflict with Section 41-3-401 (b),
placing exclusive original jurisdiction with the board when
the issue is abandonment-unless Section 1-37-106 can be
construed as altogether excluding the consideration of abandonment in a general adjudication under its provisions.
For reasons which were discussed in an earlier section of
this comment, it is quite unlikely that abandonment issues
can be avoided entirely in a suit under Section 1-37-106."'
Because the court will originally have before it all
issues in a general adjudication under it, Section 1-37-106
is pro tanto an amendment of Section 41-3-401(b), which
conferred exclusive original jurisdiction on the board, where
the issue is abandonment. This result finds support in Wyoming case law. All statutes relating to the same subject or
having the same general purpose must be read as constituting
one law. If possible, all such statutes should be construed to
avoid conflicting or confusing results; however, if a conflict
cannot be reconciled so that the provisions of all the statutes
can stand together, then a later provision will prevail over a
prior one, and the prior law is considered amended by implication to the extent of the conflict.7 1 It is clear that the board

has lost its exclusive original jurisdiction over abandonment
73. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., 487
P.2d 324 (1971). [Hereinafter cited in text as Kearney Lake].
74. 1973 WYO. SESS. LAWS Ch. 176. § 1. Now Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-401(b) (1977).
[Hereinafter cited in text as Section 41-3-401(b)].
75. WYO. STAT. § 1-37-106(a) (i) (A) (I) (1977). For the relevant text of the
statute, see note 9, supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 49 through 54, eupra.
77. Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc,,.568 P.2d 908, 913 (Wyo. 1977).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/3

12

Edwards: McCarran Amendment General Adjudications in Wyoming: Threshold Pr
COMMENTS

1981

when that issue is raised in a suit under Section 1-37-106.
What is not clear from the language of Section 1-37-106 is
the status of the board in such a suit when abandonment is
raised. If abandonment is raised, it is within the discretion
of the court to refer that issue to the board of control. There
is a strong argument for the court to do so, applying the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
All the policy reasons which led the Wyoming Supreme
Court to the conclusion that the board should have primary
jurisdiction over abandonment remain in the case of a general
adjudication. Utilizing the board has the virtues of uniformity
of decision and access to expertise.7" In addition, there is a
suggestion in Kearney Lake that where the district court
has jurisdiction but refers abandonment to the board, the
procedure should be along the lines of Rule 53 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, for masters.79 This suggestion
seems to fit precisely into the framework of the new general
adjudication statue, which prescribes the use of Rule 53 by
the board in considering issues certified to it.80
In short, Section 1-37-106 takes from the board of control the exclusive original jurisdiction given the board in
Section 41-3-401 (b). On the issue of abandonment, the
situation under Section 1-37-106 is the same as when abandonment was first raised before the court under the old
system of concurrent jurisdiction. A court conducting a suit
under Section 1-37-106 should recognize the similarity, and
certify abandonment issues to the board by the mechanism
suggested in Kearney Lake: primary jurisdiction. In addition, the court should note that Section 1-37-106 specifically
provides terms for using the board, while omitting any
reference to the use of a special master. The only difference
between Kearney Lake and Section 1-37-106 in this respect
is that under the concurrent jurisdiction approach decisions
of the board of control were final unless appealed; while
under Section 1-37-106, once issues have been certified to
78. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., supra
note 73, at 325.
79. Id.
80. WYo.

STAT.

9, 8upra.

§ 1-37-106 (1977). For the relevant text of the statute, 86e note
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and decided by the board of control, the board's findings
must be accepted under Rule 53(e) (2) unless clearly
erroneous.
In Wyoming the courts and the board of control have
concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate rights to appropriate
water for beneficial use and to determine state water right
priorities.8 This result flows both from state statutes" and
case law. The same considerations which led the Wyoming
Supreme Court to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
in Kearney Lake, for abandonment, should lead the court
conducting a suit under Section 1-37-106 to invoke the doctrine in favor of the board of control when the issues are
appropriation of water for beneficial use or determination
of state water right priorities. 4 Such a use of the board of
control was clearly foreseen and approved by the Wyoming
Supreme Court in 1949:
Irrigation matters frequently involve many technicalities in connection with which courts cannot be
expected to be experts, while the members of the
Board of Control supposedly are . . . . The trial
court would have had the right to ask the parties
to go and have the matter of priorities first determined by the Board of Control . . . .We find no
good reason why the court may not avail itself of
the aid which may be furnished by having a previous adjudication of the right made by the Board
of Control, just as it might refer a case to a referee.8"
While the language of the Wyoming Supreme Court is
permissive, it is also consistent with the Kearney Lake
rationale for primary jurisdiction.
In the context of the Big Horn River Adjudication, the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction should be applied, and
certification to the board of control should be made, whenever issues of beneficial use, abandonment, or priority of
81.
8M
•83.
84.

Anita Ditch Co. v. Turner, 389 P.2d 1018 (Wyo. 1964).
WYO. STAT. §§ 41-4-310 and 41-4-325 (1977).
Simmons v. Ramsbottom, 51 Wyo.. 419, 68 P.2d 153, 159 (1937).
Primary jurisdiction of the board of control over priority questions is discussed in more detail in Note, supra note 70, at 608-09.

85.- Laramie Rivers Co. v. LeVasseur, supbra note 64.
86. See text accompanying note 78, sUpra.
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state water rights arise in the suit. Obviously, these applications of primary jurisdiction would initially remove such
issues from the purview of the special master.
ROLE OF THE SPECIAL MASTER

The special master in the Big Horn River Adjudication
has apparently chosen to define confirm as "limited inquiry". 7 But if the court invokes the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, it should certify all questions of abandonment, 8"
beneficial use, and priority 9 of state water rights to the
board of control. Such a certification to the board would
clear the way for the special master to devote his efforts to
the portion of Section 1-37-106 dealing with reserved rights
of the United States and the Tribes. This task is set out in
Section 1-37-106(a) (i) (A) (IV) of the Wyoming Statutes: 9"
Determine the extent and priority date of and
adjudicate any interest in or right to use the water
of the river system and all other sources not otherwise represented by the afore-described decrees,
certificates, or permits.
In this area of reserved rights, the considerations which
dictate primary jurisdiction for the board of control are
largely absent. The board has no experience in adjudicating
reserved rights. Such rights, by their nature, cannot have
been abandoned by nonuse, nor need they be put to beneficial
use to establish their validity. The expertise of the board can
be of little help in this area, and there is no concern that a
determination by the special master will not mesh with the
work of the board of control-the board has done no work
in the area of reserved rights. There is no good reason,
therefore, why the special master should not concentrate on
87. This is evidenced by an order of the Special Master, setting out a stipulation
among counsel for Wyoming, the United States, and the Tribes, in which
they agree to a provisional conformation of previously adjudicated rights.
-They further agree to refrain from challenging these provisionally confirmed rights until after all federal and Indian claims have been determined by the Special Master and the district court. The Tribes and the
United States may contest only those rights which have a higher priority
than their own. Order of the Special Master (June 26, 1980).
88-.See text-accompanying- note 77;-8upr..
89. See text accompanying note 81, supra.
90. WYo. STAT. § 1-37-106(a) (i) (A) (IV) (1977).
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issues relating to reserved rights. This procedure should
put to rest any federal fear that bias would influence the
board of control. Withholding the consideration of reserved
rights from the board leaves with the special master the
principal area where state and federal rights are in direct
conflict, and thus also removes the principal area where
any bias of the board could harm federal interests.
Arguments that the board of control is disqualified"'
from assuming primary jurisdiction over questions of abandonment, beneficial use, and priorities of state water rights
are best met by pointing to the need for uniformity of
decision, the expertise of the board in these areas, and the
fact :that under Wyoming Rule of CiVil Procedure 53 the
district court may exercise control over the board. The
district court may modify or reject the board's report, or
may recommit it to the board with instructions." In addition, there is no real conflict between federal and state
interests when a bona fide question of abandonment is raised.
The state wishes to update its records so that it can more
effectively administer its waters; the board would therefore
have no reason to automatically rule out abandonment.
CONCLUSION

Section 1-37-106 of the Wyoming Statutes meets the
requirements of the McCarran Amendment for judicial
"suits" and for general adjudications. Under Section 1-37106, the board of control should have primary jurisdiction
over abandonment and over questions of priority. It is
possible to construe Section 1-37-106 in a way which allows
'paper" rights to be removed from -the files of the state
engineer, while at the same time it allows the validity of
prior adjudications themselves to go. unchallenged. This
construction should be adopted.
A special master in a suit under Section 1-37-106 should
defer to the board of control onissues of abandonment,
beneficial use, and priority of state water rights. He should,
91. See note 11, supra.
92. Wyo. R. CIv. P. 53.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/3

16

Edwards: McCarran Amendment General Adjudications in Wyoming: Threshold Pr

1981

69

COMMENTS

however, hear all issues having to do with federal reserved
rights, since he is as well-equipped to do so as the board of
control, and since no previous work of the board would
thereby be disturbed.
DAVID W. EDWARDS
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